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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to assess the short and medium-term impact of debt crises on GDP. Using an unbalanced 
panel of 154 countries from 1970 to 2008, the paper shows that debt crises produce significant and long-lasting 
output losses, reducing output by about 10 percent after 8 years. The results also suggest that debt crises tend to be 
more detrimental than banking and currency crises. The significance of the results is robust to different 
specifications, identification and endogeneity checks, and datasets. 
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1. Introduction 
 The recent general increase in public debt levels and severe funding pressures facing by 
some European countries have brought once again discussions on the problems of sovereign 
debt. The discussions have mainly focused on the impact of banking crises and economic 
slowdown on public debt1, rather than the costs of debt crises. Although it is a common view that 
debt crises may be damaging and that large increase in public debt has frequently led to 
sovereign defaults, with negative effects on output only few studies have tested the effect of debt 
crises on output, and even less papers have focused on the timing of the recovery after debt crisis 
episodes.2   
 The economic literature has identified three main channels through which sovereign 
debt crises affect output.3 The first channel is through the exclusion from international capital 
markets. Sandleirs et al. (2004) show that after the occurrence of a sovereign default, countries 
were excluded from international capital markets for about four years on average. Similarly, 
Richmond and Dias (2008) find that exclusions to international capital markets after a sovereign 
default lasted on average 4 years (5.5 years for debt crisis episodes in the 1980s, 4.1 in the 1990s, 
and 2.5 in the 2000s). The second channel is through an increase in the cost of borrowing. For 
example, Borensztein and Panizza (2009) find that for 31 emerging market economies in the 
period 1997-2004, in the year after a sovereign default episode spreads increased by about 400 
                                                           
1
 The OECD Economic Outlook (2010) projects that the increase in the gross debt-to-GDP ratio for OECD 
economies during the period 2007-2014 around 35 percentage points. Similar results are provided by IMF Fiscal 
Monitor (2010). Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010c) analyzing a panel of 154 countries from 1980 to 2006, show that 
severe banking crises are associated with a significant and long-lasting increase of about 37 percentage points of the 
government gross debt-to-GDP ratio. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) estimate that in the three years after the 
occurrence of a banking crisis the real value of government debt rose on average by 86%. 
2
 Cerra and Saxena (2008) Panizza et al., (2009). 
3
 See Panizza et al. (2009) for a survey of the recent literature on sovereign debt defaults, its determinants and 
effects.  
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basis points compared to tranquil times. The third channel is through international trade. Rose 
(2005) finds a significant reduction in bilateral trade of approximately 8 percent per year 
following the occurrence of a sovereign default.4 In addition to these channels, debt crises can 
affect output indirectly by leading to banking and currency crises (De Paoli et al. 2009).  
The results of the empirical literature on the relation between sovereign default and 
growth have in general confirmed that debt crises may lead to significant output contractions. 
Sturzenegger (2004), using cross-country and panel regressions finds that debt defaults are 
associated with a reduction in output growth of about 0.6-2.2 percentage points. De Paoli et al. 
(2009), comparing output growth five years before and after the occurrence of a debt crisis, find 
that debt crises are associated with output losses of at least 5 percent per year and last about ten 
years. In contrast, Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2010) analyzing quarterly data for output growth 
find that growth recovers in the quarters immediately after the occurrence of a debt crisis.5  
The results of these growth regressions, however, should be interpreted with some 
cautions since may suffer from two main biases. First, sovereign debt crises may be endogenous 
to output contractions. Indeed, many of episodes of debt defaults have occurred in period of 
strong output falls. Chiang and Coronado (2005) and Boreinsztein and Panizza (2010) attempt to 
address this issue by using a two–step approach, in which the probability of sovereign defaults is 
estimated in the first stage regression, and then used as a regressor in the second stage in the 
growth regression. However, this approach does not fully address endogeneity problems given 
the impossibility to find strongly exogenous instruments for debt crises. In addition, the results of 
                                                           
4
 Sovereign default can also affect economic output thought domestic channels such as a reduction in consumption 
and investment or fall in total factor productivity.  
5
 The authors argue that a more persistent impact of sovereign default found using annual data is likely to be driven 
by the anticipation of defaults. Panizza et al. (2009) comparing the impact of anticipated and non-anticipates 
defaults on output find no significant differences between two types of crises.  
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the second stage regression may be very sensitive to the particular model used to estimate debt 
crises probabilities. 
 The second form of bias comes from the indistinguishable connection that exists 
between currency, banking and debt crises. This is particularly the case for emerging economies 
that have been frequently hit by the simultaneous occurrence of banking, currency, and debt 
crises. The simultaneous occurrence of these types of financial crises is often attributed to the so-
called “original sin” syndrome (Eichengreen et al., 2003), occurring when most of the private 
and public debt is short-term denominated in foreign currency. Following large domestic 
exchange rate depreciations associated with currency crises, public debt (when mostly foreign 
denominated) can increase considerably and lead to defaults. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a,b) 
suggest the following causality: private sector defaults precede banking sector crises that 
coincide or precede public debt defaults. At the same, the opposite may also occur: public debt 
defaults may lead to banking crises when banks are the main holders of government debt. 
Banking and debt crises could also lead to currency crises. For instance, third generation crises 
theory (Krugman, 1999) underlines the role of maturity mismatches and currency disequilibria in 
private (mostly banking sector) balance sheets as the main reason for the onset of currency 
crises.  
 This paper tries to address these issues. In particular, its contribution to the existing 
literature is fourfold:  
• It analyzes the impact of debt crises on output both in the short and in the medium-
term. 
• It attempts to address endogeneity and reverse causality by using two approaches. The 
first, in line with the most recent empirical literature that analyzes the determinants of 
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growth in a panel framework, consists of using a two-step GMM-system estimator. 
The second approach consists of estimating the impact of debt crises on growth using 
the two-step GMM only for those debt crises episodes that occurred in periods when 
contemporaneous output did not fall. 
• It tries to isolate the impact of debt crises from the effect of banking and currency 
crises using two different estimation strategies. The first approach consists of 
estimating the effect of debt crises on output together with the effect of currency and 
banking crises. In this way, it is possible to quantify the marginal contribution of each 
crisis to output. In the second strategy, the effect of debt crises on output is estimated 
only for those episodes for which neither a banking nor a currency crisis occurred in 
the 2 years before, during, or after the onset of a debt crisis.  
• To check for the robustness of our results, it uses several datasets of starting dates for 
debt crises episodes. 
The estimates based on an unbalanced panel of 154 countries from 1970 to 2008 suggest 
that debt crises are very costly to output both in the short and in the medium-term. In the short-
term, the results suggest that debt crises reduce contemporaneous output growth by 6 percentage 
points. The results are robust to different specifications, and to different robustness checks to 
control for endogeneity and identification of debt crises (vs. banking and currency crises). In 
particular, focusing on those debt crisis episodes characterized by a contemporaneous non-
negative growth, the analysis suggests that debt crises reduce output growth by about 6-10 
percentage points. Similarly, focusing on debt crisis episodes for which neither a banking nor a 
currency crisis occurred in the two 2 years before, during, or after the onset of a debt crisis, the 
results confirm that debt crises significantly and negatively affect contemporaneous output 
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growth, with a magnitude of the effect of about 8 percentage points. The results are also robust to 
alternative datasets with a magnitude of the effect ranging from 5 to 10 percentage points.  
Debt crises are also associated with significant output losses over the medium-term: 8 
years after the occurrence of a debt crisis, output contracts by about 10 percent. The statistically 
significance of the result is robust to the estimation procedures used (local projections and 
ARDL) and to different specifications.  
Finally, the paper presents empirical evidence that output growth is reduced not only by 
the occurrence of a debt crisis, but also -although to a lesser extent- when public (total and 
foreign) debt exceeds a particular threshold. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
identification of debt crises episodes. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology used to 
assess the short and medium-term effects of debt crises on output, and the results. Section 4 
summarizes the main results and concludes with some issues for future research. 
 
2. Data  
To identify debt crises episodes the paper relies on several datasets (Table 1): 
• The first dataset is the one constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2008) who list the 
starting date of debt crisis episodes as a compilation of years of sovereign defaults to private 
lending and years of debt rescheduling. The authors rely on information from Beim and 
Calomiris (2001), World Bank (2002), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), and IMF Staff 
reports.6 Overall the authors identify 63 crises episodes, which mainly occurred in the 1980s: 7 
                                                           
6
 The Work Bank Global Development Finance Report (2002) provides a list of 26 countries for which debt-
restructuring agreements with their commercial creditors were completed in 2001. Beim and Calomiris (2001) 
provide the date of debt defaults for several emerging economies during the period 1970-2000. Sturzenegger and 
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episodes occurred in the period 1970-1979, 41 between 1980 and 1989, 7 in the period 1990-
1999, and 8 after 1999. 
• The second set of banking crises episodes is the one collected by De Paoli et al. (2006). 
The authors identify 39 episodes of sovereign default over the period 1970-2000 when the 
arrears on principal on external obligations towards private creditors reach at least 15 percent of 
total commercial debt outstanding and/or there is a rescheduling with private creditors as listed in 
the World Bank’s Global Development Finance. 
• An alternative dataset of debt crises episodes is the one constructed by Reinhart et al. 
(2003). The authors identify 31 debt crises episodes over the period 1970-2001 using the dates 
reported in Beim and Calomiris (2001) on defaults and restructurings, and Standard and Poor’s 
Credit Week information.  
• A fourth dataset is Detragiache and Spillimbergo (2000) which covers 54 episodes of 
debt crises. Defaults are identified when arrears of principal on interest on external obligations 
towards commercial creditors exceed 5 percent of total commercial debt outstanding (excluding 
the episodes that occur within four years of the previous defaults) and/or there is a rescheduling 
with private creditors as listed in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance. 
• Finally, the last dataset considered in the analysis is Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2010). 
The authors identify 20 default episodes over the period 1980-2003 (excluding the episodes that 
occur within three years of the previous defaults). Episodes are classified as beginning years of 
foreign currency bank or bond debt default, using information reported in Standard and Poor’s 
Credit Week, World Bank’s Global Development Finance and the financial press.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Zettelmeyer (2006) list selected government defaults and restructurings of private held bonds and loans over the 
period 1920-2004. 
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 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for total and foreign public debt (as share of GDP), 
and GDP growth in relation to the debt crises episodes identified in the datasets described above. 
Looking at the table, it is immediately evident that starting dates of debt crises are associated 
with periods of negative growth and relative high domestic and foreign public debt. In particular, 
focusing on the first row of the table (for which more episodes and more observations for public 
debt are available) debt crises generally occur when the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio is higher 
than 80 percentage points, the public foreign gross debt-to-GDP ratio is above 55 percentage 
points, and GDP growth is about - 2 percent.  
Data for banking and currency crises episodes are taken from Laeven and Valencia 
(2008). The authors determine the starting dates of banking crises combining quantitative 
indicators measuring banking sector distress, such as a sharp increase in non-performing loans 
and bank runs, with a subjective assessment of the situation. In particular, the database extends 
and builds on Caprio et al. (2005) banking crises database and covers the universe of systemic 
banking crises for the period 1970-2007. Currency crises episodes are identified when a currency 
have a nominal depreciation of 10 percent in one year, and 30 percent overall (Frankel and Rose, 
1996).  Data for real GDP are taken from the World Bank Economic Indicators. Data for public 
(domestic and foreign7) debt are taken from Panizza (2008). 
  
3. Empirical Analysis  
This section analyzes the impact of debt crises on short-term growth. The first part of the 
section assesses the short-term effect of debt crises controlling for reversal causality, 
identification of debt crises (vs. banking and currency crises) and providing several robustness 
                                                           
7
 Foreign debt is defined as public debt issued in foreign countries and under the jurisdiction of a foreign court. 
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checks. Additionally, it investigates the impact of the (total and foreign) public debt-to-GDP 
ratio on output and existence of debt thresholds. The second part of the section extends the 
analysis to the medium-term, analyzing the response of output up to 8 years after the occurrence 
of a debt crisis.  
3.1 Short-term 
Following previous studies in the literature on the short-term effects of banking and/or 
currency crises on output, the methodological approach used in the paper consists of estimating 
contemporaneous output growth against a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 for the 
occurrence of a crisis and 0 otherwise, and a set of variables influencing short-term growth. In 
particular, the formal specification of the empirical model used for the short-term analysis is as 
follows: 
,  ,  	 
 ,
 
  
 ,                                           (1) 
 where , is the log of real GDP for country i at time t and zero otherwise, ,  is a dummy 
variable that takes the value equal to 1 if a debt crisis occurred in country i at time t and 0 
otherwise, 	 are country-specific effects included to account for different growth trends among 
countries,  is a set of variables influencing growth in the short-term, and β represents the 
marginal effect of the occurrence of a debt crisis on growth.  The empirical literature on growth 
has suggested numerous variables as possible determinants of growth (see, for example, Levine 
and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997, Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004). However, some of these 
variables are likely to influence growth only over the medium–term, and are not available on a 
yearly basis (e.g., human capital) over a long time span and for a large set of countries. Therefore 
to keep the specification parsimonious, the variables included in the vector  have been 
restricted to: trade openness (defined as the share of total exports and imports in GDP), 
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population growth, (private) credit growth, real exchange rate growth and the initial (lagged) 
level of GDP. In addition, given that the main concern is to introduce relevant control variables 
into the regression so that the estimated impact of a debt crisis on output is not biased due to the 
omission of variables, two lags of real GDP growth have been included. 
 To address endogeneity due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable among 
regressors and to reverse causality from growth to the occurrence of debt crises, Equation 1 has 
been estimated using the two-step GMM-system estimator. 8 
The results obtained estimating Equation 1 (column I, Table 3) suggest that debt crises 
significantly reduce contemporaneous output growth by about 6 percentage points. The 
significance of the results is robust across the different specifications with an estimated impact 
that ranges from about 5 to 6 percentage points (column II-VII, Table 3).  
The controls variables that have a positive and (most of the time) statistically significant 
effect are trade openness, population growth, credit growth and the first lag of real GDP growth. 
Consistency of the two-step GMM estimates has been checked by using the Hansen and the 
Arellano-Bond tests. The Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall 
validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation process, cannot reject the null hypothesis that full set of orthogonality conditions are 
valid (across the different specifications the p-value ranges from 0.3 to 1). The Arellano–Bond 
test for autocorrelation cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in 
                                                           
8
 The two-step GMM-system estimates (with Windmeijer standard errors) are computed using the xtabond2 Stata 
command developed by Roodman (2009). Openness, lagged real exchange rate growth, lagged real credit growth, 
lagged credit growth and lagged debt crises are as predetermined, other control variables are considered as 
endogenous (instrumented using up to 3 lags). The significance of the results is robust to different choices of 
instruments and predetermined variables. 
 
 11 
 
the first-differenced error terms (across the different specifications the p-value ranges from 0.2 to 
1).  
Although these tests confirm the consistency of the GMM estimates, reverse causality 
from growth to debt crises may be still an issue, since as shown in Table 2 debt crises tend to 
occur in periods of negative growth, and because of the impossibility to find strongly exogenous 
instruments for debt crises. To address this issue and to check the robustness of the results, 
Equation 1 has been re-estimated excluding those debt crises episodes that occurred in periods 
when contemporaneous output has fallen after a period of positive growth (growtht <0, growtht-1 
>0 ). Two different specifications are estimated. In the first specification all observations are 
considered. In the second one, the observations characterized by contemporaneous negative 
growth and the occurrence of a debt crisis are dropped. The results obtained for both 
specifications confirm that debt crises have a statistically significant and negative impact on 
contemporaneous output growth (column VIII and IX, Table 3).9  
To check for the robustness of the results, another approach to address reverse causality 
from growth to debt crises, somewhat similar to the GMM approach, has been also carried out. 
Following Chiang and Coronado (2005) and Boreinsztein and Panizza (2009), the approach 
consists of estimating the probability of default using various predictors of debt crises, and then 
using the predicted probability of default as a regressor in the growth regression.  The results 
obtained with this approach, not reported, confirm that debt crises have a significant and negative 
effect on contemporaneous output growth. The magnitude of the effect, however, is very sensible 
                                                           
9
 The probability of default is estimated using a Logit model and considering as explanatory variables: i) the debt-to-
GDP ratio; ii) banking crisis dummy; iii) currency crisis dummy; iv) contemporaneous and lagged growth; v) the 
ratio of foreign reserve-to-GDP; vi) the ratio of short-term debt-to-GDP ; vii) openness; ix) exchange rate volatility 
and) inflation. The full set of  results is available upon request.  
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to the choice of specification used to estimate default probabilities, with point estimates that 
range from 1 to 25 percentage points.  
Finally, as additional robustness check, Equation (1) has been re-estimated using the 
alternative datasets described in Section 2. The results reported in Table 4 provide robust 
empirical evidence that debt crises have a significant and negative effect on contemporaneous 
output. The magnitude of the point estimates varies across datasets, ranging from 5 to 10 
percentage points. Since these datasets mainly differ for the composition of the countries for 
which a debt crisis is attributed, rather than the dating of the crisis itself, it is likely that the 
different estimates simply reflect the heterogeneous response of countries to the debt crises and 
the different severity of the crises. However, these differences are not statistically significant. 
 
3.1.1. Debt vs. Currency and Banking Crises 
The close connection between currency, banking and debt crises, makes it particularly 
difficult to isolate the impact of debt crises on the real output. For example, as pointed out by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) it is possible that a banking (and/or currency) crisis may trigger a 
debt crisis, in which case the estimated effect of debt crises on contemporaneous output growth 
could be just interpreted as the lagged effect of banking (or currency) crises episodes. To address 
this issue two different approaches have been carried out.  
The first approach consists of estimating the effect of debt crises on output together with 
the effect of currency and banking crises. In this way, it is possible to quantify the marginal 
contribution of each crisis to output. To this purpose the following specification is estimated: 
,  ,  	 
 
 
 ,
 
 ,
 
 ,
 
 ,
 ,
 
 ,
 ,
 
               
 
,
 ,
 
 ,
 ,
 ,
 
 ,                                                                (2) 
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where ,  (,  is a dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 if a currency (banking) crisis 
occurred in country i at time t, and zero otherwise. The (full) empirical specification includes 
three types of twin crises: debt-currency (, , , debt-banking , , , and currency-banking 
(, , ). Similarly to Hutchinson and Noy (2005), twin crises are defined as those crises in 
which the onset of a given crisis occurs 2 years before, during, or after the onset of another type 
of crises. Finally, Equation (3) also includes triple debt-currency-banking crises , , , . 
Analogously to the definition of twin crises, triple crises are defined as those crises in which the 
onset of a given crisis occurs 2 years before, during, or after the onset of the other two types of 
crises. The coefficients , , , ,,  and   represent the marginal effect of debt, currency, 
banking, twin and triple crises on output growth. Thus, if the "( coefficients are found to be 
negative and statistically significant it implies that the occurrence of a twin (triple) crisis has an 
additional negative impact on output growth above and beyond the combined effect of the two 
(three) types of crises. The results obtained estimating Equation 3 (Table 5) confirm that debt 
crises significantly reduce output growth with an estimated impact that ranges across the 
different specifications from 5 to 8 percentage points (column I-IV). More interestingly, looking 
at the full specification the effect of debt crises seems to be more detrimental than the effect of 
currency or banking crises. Among the twin and the triple crises dummy, only the twin banking-
currency crisis has a negative and statistically significant effect. The results are qualitatively 
robust to different year windows (1 year and 3 years). 
The second approach consists of estimating the effect of debt crises on output together 
with the effect of currency and banking crises but only for those episodes for which neither a 
banking nor a currency crisis occurred in the 2 years before, during, or after the onset of a debt 
crisis. By doing this, the number of debt crises episodes is reduced to 20. The results obtained 
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with this approach confirm that debt crises significantly reduce output growth (column V of 
Table 4). In particular, the occurrence of a debt crisis, neither preceded nor followed by a 
banking and/or a currency crisis, is found to reduce contemporaneous output growth by about 8 
percentage points.   
 
 
3.1.2 Debt thresholds 
The results presented in the previous section have provided strong empirical evidence 
that debt crises significantly reduce contemporaneous output growth. An interesting hypothesis 
to test is also whether output growth is reduced not only by the occurrence of a debt crisis, but 
also when public (total and foreign) debt exceeds a particular threshold. A first work in this 
direction is Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a). The authors, analyzing a multi-country historical large 
dataset on central government debt as well as data on external (public and private) debt, present 
descriptive evidence showing that when the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90 percent, 
median growth rates fall by one percentage points. Similarly, annual growth declines by about 
two percentage points when external debt reaches 60 percent of GDP.  
 To test the Reinhart and Rogoff’s predictions a model specification similar to Equation 
(1) has been estimated alternatively using the debt-to-GDP ratio (foreign debt-to-GDP) and a 
dummy variable taking a value equal to 1 if the gross debt-to-GDP (foreign debt-to-GDP) ratio 
exceeds a given thresholds and zero otherwise. Table 6 reports the results obtained for the linear 
and non-linear effects of debt on output growth. Starting with the debt-to-GDP ratio (column I-
IV), the results provide no statistically evidence of a linear relationship between growth and debt,  
and show that output is reduced by about 1.8 percentage points when the debt-GDP ratio exceeds 
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70 percentage points. Lower thresholds, tested but not reported, are found to be not statistically 
significant, while the 80 and 90 percent thresholds are associated with a decline in output growth 
greater than 2 percentage points. Similarly, higher thresholds are found to not contribute 
significantly to additional negative effects. This finding is consistent with the evidence provided 
in recent studies (Kumar and Woo, 2010; Checherita and Rother, 2010; and Carner et al. 2010). 
The results for the foreign debt-to-GDP provide only weak statistical evidence of a linear 
relationship between foreign debt and output growth, and show that output growth is reduced by 
about 2.4 percentage points when the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 80 percentage points. 
Lower thresholds, such as 60 and 70 percent, are not statistically significant at 5 percent. 
Similarly, higher thresholds are found to not contribute significantly to additional negative 
effects. 
  Overall, the results seems to validate Reinhart and Rogoff’s predictions (i.e. the existence 
of thresholds for the debt-to-GDP ratio and the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio above which output 
growth starts to decline) although not in terms of the magnitude of these effects.  
The analysis also suggests that the effect of high (total and foreign) debt is considerably 
lower than the effect of debt crises, which indirectly implies that the channel through which debt 
crises negatively affect output is not uniquely via a large debt burden.10 
 
 
3.2 Medium-term 
This paper also assesses whether the effect of debt crises on output is reverted over the 
medium-term. In order to estimate the medium-term dynamic impact of debt crises episodes on 
                                                           
10
 The results are confirmed when threshold and debt crisis dummies are jointly included in the estimation. In 
particular both dummies result to be statistically significant, but while debt crises reduce output by about 4-5 
percentage points, higher debt levels (total and foreign) reduce output by about 1.5-2 percentage points. 
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output, the paper follows the method proposed by Jorda (2005) and Teuling and Zubanov (2010) 
which consists of estimating impulse response functions (IRFs) directly from local projections. 
In detail, for each future period k the following equation has been estimated on annual data: 
,#$  ,  	
$ 
 %&'(
$ 
 ∑ *+
$,
+- ∆,+ 
 $,
 
 ,
$
                                                    (3) 
with k= 1,..8, 	$  are country fixed effects, Timei are country-specific time trends and  $ 
measures the impact of debt crises on the change of (the log of) the real output for each future 
period k. The number of lags (l) has been chosen equal to two, even if the results are extremely 
robust to different numbers of lags included in the specification. Corrections for 
heteroskedasticity, when appropriate, have been applied using White robust standard errors. 
Impulse response functions (IRFs) are then obtained by plotting the estimated $ for k= 0,1,..8, 
with 95% confidence bands for the estimated IRFs being computed using the standard deviations 
associated with the estimated coefficients $. While the presence of a lagged dependent variable 
and country fixed effects may in principle bias the estimation of *+$in small samples (Nickel, 
1981), this does not create a bias in the estimation of the coefficients of interest $ (Teulings and 
Zubanov, 2010). In addition, the length of the time dimension mitigates possible concerns of 
such a bias.11 
The results from estimating the medium-term impact of debt crises on output using 
Equation (3) are presented in Panel A of Figure 1. The figure suggests that debt crises have long-
lasting effects, reducing output even 8 years after the occurrence of the crisis. In particular, the 
estimates suggest that 8 years after the occurrence of a debt crisis output contracts by about 10 
percent.  
                                                           
11
 The finite sample bias is in the order of 1/T, where T in our sample is 39. 
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To check for the robustness of our results, Equation (3) has been re-estimated by 
alternatively including a common time trend and time fixed effects (Annex 1). The results using 
these different controls remain statistically significant and broadly unchanged. As an additional 
robustness test the medium-term impact of debt crises on output has been re-estimated using an 
ARDL (4, 4) equation12:  
∆  / 
 ∑ *+∆,+
0
+- 
 ∑ +,+
 
0
+-1                        (4) 
The impulse response functions (IRFs) are obtained by simulating a one year crisis and by 
computing the response of output over time through the estimated coefficients, and 95-percent 
level confidence bands are derived using Monte-Carlo simulations using one thousand of trials. 
The results obtained estimating Equation (4) with both OLS and GMM confirms that debt crises 
have long-lasting effects on output: 8 years after the occurrence of a debt crises output contracts 
by about 9-12 percentage points (Annex 1). 
 Finally, in order to address possible reverse causality13 and identification problems 
discussed in the previous section, Equation (3) has been re-estimated by alternatively 
considering: i) those debt crises episodes with contemporaneous non-negative growth; ii) debt 
crises episodes for which neither a banking nor a currency crisis occurred in the nine years 
before, during, or after the onset of a debt crisis. The results for these two cases are shown in 
Panel B add C of Figure 1, and corroborate the negative impact of debt crises on output over the 
medium-term. 
                                                           
12
 The approach was initially proposed by Romer and Romer (1989) and then recently applied by Cerra and Saxena 
(2008), Furceri and Mourougane (2009) and Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011) to assess the long-term impact of 
banking crises on economic activity. It is worth to stress that the IRFs derived using this approach may suffer from 
some problem such as i) to be sensible to the choice of the number of lags, making thus the IRFs less stable; ii) the 
significance of long-lasting effects on output can be simply driven by the use of one-type of shock models (Cai and 
Den Haan, 2009); iii) medium-term effects are more sensible to endogeneity problems, since are implicitly derived 
by estimating contemporaneous output growth. 
13
 In this approach the risk of reverse causality between changes in (the log of) output and the occurrence of a debt 
crisis is quite small since changes in output are estimated for subsequent periods (from t+1 to t+8). This is 
particularly the case for the estimates of the medium-term effect (i.e 8 years after the occurrence of a debt crisis). 
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4. Conclusions and issues for future research 
The paper analyzes the short and medium-run effects of debt crises on output for an 
unbalanced panel of 154 countries from 1970 to 2008. In the short-term, the results suggest that 
debt crises are very damaging, reducing contemporaneous output growth by 6 percentage points. 
The results are robust to different specifications, and to different robustness checks to control for 
endogeneity and identification of debt crises (vs. banking and currency crises). In particular, 
focusing on those debt crisis episodes characterized by a contemporaneous non-negative growth, 
the analysis suggest that debt crises reduce output growth by about 6-10 percentage points. 
Similarly, focusing on debt crises episodes for which neither a banking nor a currency crisis 
occurred in the two 2 years before, during, or after the onset of a debt crisis, the results confirm 
that debt crises significantly and negatively affect contemporaneous output growth, with a 
magnitude of the effect of about 8 percentage points. The results are also robust to alternative 
datasets with a magnitude of the effect ranging from 5 to 10 percentage points. Since these 
datasets mainly differ for the composition of the countries for which a debt crisis is attributed, 
rather than the dating of the crisis itself, it is likely that the different estimates simply reflect the 
heterogeneous response of countries to the debt crises and the different severity of the crises. 
These differences are, however, not statistically significant. 
The medium term analysis confirms the negative effect of debt crises on output growth. 
In particular, debt crises are associated with protracted output losses: 8 years after the occurrence 
of a debt crisis, output contracts by about 10 percent. The statistically significance of the result is 
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robust to the estimation procedures used (local projections and ARDL) and to different 
specifications. These are large estimates and should alarm policy makers about the risk of 
possible future debt crises. 
Our study suggests that a number of interesting extensions can be pursued.  First, as 
suggested by the results obtained for different datasets, the response of output to debt crises may 
vary across countries. Therefore, it would be useful to empirically examine the determinants of 
this heterogeneity. 
An additional promising direction would be to expand the investigation on whether 
output is negatively affected not only by the occurrence of a debt crisis, but also when public 
(total and foreign) debt exceeds a particular threshold. The results presented in the paper suggest 
that output growth declines by about 1.8 percentage points (2.4 percentage points) when the 
gross debt-to-GDP ratio (foreign debt-GDP ratio) exceeds 70 (80) percentage points. This 
analysis could be extended by analyzing thresholds with non-parametric approaches, and by 
looking at possible interactions between the share of public (total and foreign) debt and other 
variables such as trade openness, domestic saving, financial integration, financial development, 
and measures of perceived country risks. 
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Figure 1. The effect of debt crises on output-baseline  
A. Debt crises 
 
B. Debt crises with non-contemporaneous fall in output 
 
C. Debt crises non-overlapping with other crises 
 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 95% confidence bands. 
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Table 1. Debt Crises Episodes 
LV Morocco 1983 Bulgaria 1991 Argentina 1982 Dominican R. 1982,1999 Haiti 1983 
Albania 1990 Mozambique 1984 Cameroon 1983 Bolivia 1980 Ecuador 1999 Honduras 1976,1983 
Angola 1988 Nicaragua 1980 Chile 1983 Brazil 1983 Indonesia 1998 Indonesia 1998 
Argentina 1982,2001 Niger 1983 Congo, D. R. 1970,1985 Bulgaria 1990 Mexico 1982 Jordan 1989 
Bolivia 1980 Nigeria 1983 Costa Rica 1981,1986 Chile 1972 Nigeria 1983,1986 Kenya 1990 
Brazil 1983 Panama 1983 Cote d'Ivoire 1987 Costa Rica 1981 Pakistan 1997 Korea, Rep. 1998 
Bulgaria 1990 Paraguay 1982 Dominican, R.. 1984 Dominican R.1982 Peru 1980,1983  Lesotho 1990 
Cameroon 1989 Peru 1978 Ecuador 1987 Ecuador 1982,1989 Philippines 1983 Madagascar 1990 
Chile 1983 Philippines 1983 Georgia 1994 Ecuador 1999 Russia 1991,1998 Malawi 1982,1987 
Congo, D. R, 1976 Poland 1981 Grenada 1987 Egypt 1984 South Africa 1985,1989 Mexico 1982 
Congo, Rep. of 1986 Romania 1982 Guatemala 1985 Guyana 1982 Ukraine1998 Morocco 1985 
Costa Rica 1981 Russia 1998 Guyana 1979 Honduras 1981 Uruguay 1990,2003 Nicaragua 1978 
Côte d’Ivoire 1984,2001 Senegal 1981 Haiti 1983 Iran, I.R. Of 1992 DS Niger 1984 
Dominica 2002 Sierra Leone 1977 Indonesia 1998 Jamaica 1978 Algeria 1991 Nigeria 1972 ,1986 
Dominican R.  1982,2003 South Africa 1985 Jordan 1989 Jordan 1989 Argentina 1983 Panama 1987 
Ecuador 1982,1989 Sudan 1979 Mexico 1982 Mexico 1982 Bangladesh 1978, 1991 Paraguay 1984 
Egypt 1984 Tanzania 1984 Morocco 1983 Morocco 1983 Brazil 1983 Peru 1983 
Gabon, 1986,2002 Togo 1979 Nicaragua 1978,1985  Panama 1983 Burkina 1982 Philippines 1984 
Gambia, The 1986 Trinidad &Tobago 1989 Nigeria 1987 Peru 1978 ,1984 Burundi 1986 Senegal 1984,1989 
Grenada 2004 Turkey 1978 Panama 1987 Philippines 1983 Cameroon 1979 Sierra Leone 1972 
Guinea 1985 Uganda 1981 Paraguay 1983 Poland 1981 Cameroon 1985 Sri Lanka 1992 
Guyana 1982 Ukraine 1998 Peru 1983 Romania 1982 Chile 1973, 1983 Sudan 1976 
Honduras 1981 Uruguay 1983,2002 Philippines 1984 Russia 1991 Colombia 1985 Thailand 1998 
Indonesia 1999 Venezuela 1982 Russia 1990 Russia 1998 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1975 Trinidad & Tobago 1988 
Iran, I.R. of 1992 Vietnam 1985 Sri Lanka 1990 Trinidad 1989 Costa Rica 1981 Tunisia 1991 
Jamaica 1978 Zambia 1983 Syrian Arab Rep. 1986 Turkey 1978 Cote d'Ivoire 1987 Venezuela 1984 
Jordan 1989 DHS Togo 1978, 1991 Uruguay 1983 Dominican, R.  1976,1982 Zambia 1978 
Liberia 1980 Albania 1991 Trinidad &Tobago 1989 Venezuela 1982, 1995 Ecuador 1983  
Madagascar 1981 Algeria 1994 Venezuela 1984 LP Egypt 1986  
Malawi 1982 Argentina 1983 Zambia 1981 Argentina 1982 El Salvador 1984,1995  
Mexico 1982 Bolivia 1982 RHS Argentina 2001 Ethiopia 1987  
Moldova 2002 Brazil 1983  Albania 1990 Chile 1983 Guatemala 1985  
LV= Laeven and Valencia (2008); DHS=De Paoli et al. (2006); RRS= Reinhart et al. (2003); DS=Detragiache and Spillimbergo (2000); LP=Levy-Yeyati and 
Panizza (2010). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Datasets N. Crises Debt over GDP (%) Foreign debt over GDP (%) GDP Growth (%) 
  Average Max Min S.D. Average Max Min S.D. Average Max Min S.D. 
LV 63 78.3 119.4 34.4 25.5 55.9 86.3 26.5 19.6 -2.1 7.5 -14.4 5.1 
DHS 39 111.9 166.6 81.0 37.6 59.7 95.9 7.6 32.7 -2.5 10.6 -32.1 7.7 
RRS 31 68.6 85.2 47.4 19.3 53.0 65.4 39.4 13.0 -2.2 5.9 -14.4 5.4 
DS 54 63.8 142.0 10.8 39.7 41.0 70.6 6.0 23.3 0.7 15.4 -14.4 6.4 
LY 21 64.5 96.6 21.0 26.1 46.7 78.4 21.0 20.9 -2.2 6.5 -14.1 5.3 
Average  77.4    51.2    -1.7    
LV= Laeven and Valencia (2008); DHS= De Paoli et al. (2006); RRS= Reinhart et al. (2003); DS=Detragiache and Spillimbergo (2000); LP=Levy-Yeyati and 
Panizza (2010). 
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Table 3.  Output Growth and Debt Crises 
 
 (I) 
 
(II)  
 
(III)  
 
(IV) 
 
(V)  
 
(VI)  
 
(VII) (VIII) a 
 
(IX) b 
 
Debt Crises t -5.566 (-2.05)** 
-5.384 
(-2.04)** 
-5.529 
(-1.97)** 
-5.414 
(-2.01)** 
-6.065 
(-2.36)** 
-5.321 
(-1.98)** 
-6.412 
(-2.66)*** 
-5.727 
(-1.65)* 
-10.043 
(-2.65)*** 
 
         
 
         
Real GDP growth t-1 0.387 
(6.34)*** 
0.345 
(6.48)*** 
0.401 
(6.60)*** 
0.397 
(6.89)*** 
0.554 
(8.47)*** 
0.385 
(6.29)*** 
0.382 
(10.04)*** 
0.387 
(6.33)*** 
0.343 
(5.35)*** 
Real GDP growth t-2 -0.029 
(-0.88) 
- -0.033 
(-0.99) 
-0.021 
(-0.63) 
-0.033 
(-0.83) 
-0.029 
(-0.88) 
0.01 
(0.60) 
-0.026 
(-0.80) 
-0.003 
(-0.08) 
Openness t 0.735 (2.31)** 
0.791 
(2.52)*** 
- 0.769 
(2.42)** 
0.532 
(1.70)* 
0.377 
(1.97)** 
0.526 
(1.62)* 
0.738 
(2.38)** 
0.771 
(2.45)** 
Population growth t 0.215 (1.94)** 
0.200 
(1.82)* 
0.037 
(0.39) 
- 0.067 
(0.47) 
0.082 
(0.93) 
0.235 
(2.13)** 
0.200 
(1.81)* 
0.241 
(1.99)** 
Credit Growth t 0.031 (1.72)* 
0.026 
(1.51) 
0.034 
(2.04)** 
0.025 
(1.48) 
- 0.033 
(1.95)** 
-0.006 
(-0.22) 
0.028 
(1.58)* 
0.020 
(1.06) 
Real GDPt-1 (log) 0.197 (1.48) 
0.199 
(1.48) 
-0.056 
(-0.68) 
0.269 
(2.04)** 
0.211 
(1.17) 
- 0.121 
(0.84) 
0.188 
(1.40) 
0.211 
(1.37) 
Real Exchange Rate 
Growth t 
-0.001 
(-1.17) 
-0.001 
(-1.22) 
-0.001 
(-1.52) 
-0.001 
(-1.15) 
-0.001 
(-1.33) 
-0.001 
(-1.29) 
- -0.001 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(-1.04) 
 
         
N 2403 2409 2403 2404 3208 2403 3398 2403 2369 
Hansen test-pvalue 0.323 0.460 0.327 0.348 0.166 0.312 1.00 0.321 0.341 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) test-pvalue 
0.567 0.995 0.546 0.622 0.151 0.590 0.969 0.600 0.746 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
GMM-System Estimator: Two-step using Windmeijer standard errors, Openness , lagged real exchange rate growth, lagged real credit growth, lagged credit 
growth and lagged debt crises as predetermined,  other control variables considered as endogenous (instrumented using up to 3 lags).  
a
 Episodes of debt crises with contemporaneous non-negative output growth, and all growth observations. 
b
 Episodes of debt crises with contemporaneous non-negative output growth, and observations characterized by a contemporaneous negative growth and the 
occurrence of a debt crisis dropped. 
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Table 4.  Output Growth and Debt Crises 
 
 (I) 
LV 
(II)  
DHS 
(III)  
LP 
(IV)  
DS 
(V)  
RRS 
Debt Crises t -5.566 (-2.05)** 
-5.096 
(-1.72)* 
-9.984 
(-2.27)** 
-7.143 
(-1.94)** 
-9.319 
(-2.63)*** 
 
     
Real GDP growth t-1 0.387 
(6.34)*** 
0.392 
(6.33)*** 
0.380 
(6.10)*** 
0.386 
(6.19)*** 
0.396 
(6.10)*** 
Real GDP growth t-2 -0.029 
(-0.88) 
-0.023 
(-0.69) 
-0.026 
(-0.79) 
-0.011 
(-0.32) 
-0.027 
(-0.81) 
Openness t 0.735 (2.31)** 
0.685 
(2.35)** 
0.596 
(1.88)* 
0.841 
(2.95)*** 
0.723 
(2.25)** 
Population growth t 0.215 (1.94)** 
0.182 
(1.65)* 
0.176 
(1.56) 
0.259 
(2.18)** 
0.207 
(1.77)** 
Credit Growth t 0.031 (1.72)* 
0.025 
(1.39)* 
0.033 
(1.84)* 
0.013 
(0.88) 
0.029 
(1.61)* 
Real GDPt-1 (log) 0.197 (1.48) 
0.173 
(1.24) 
0.148 
(1.12) 
0.263 
(2.26)** 
0.189 
(1.39) 
Real Exchange Rate Growth t -0.001 (-1.17) 
-0.001 
(-1.00) 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.81) 
-0.001 
(-1.17) 
 
     
N 2403 2403 2403 2403 2403 
Hansen test-pvalue 0.323 0.290 0.325 0.923 0.309 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) test-pvalue 
0.567 0.687 0.699 0.730 0.688 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
GMM-System Estimator: Two-step using Windmeijer standard errors, Openness , lagged real exchange rate growth, lagged real credit growth, lagged credit 
growth and lagged debt crises as predetermined,  other control variables considered as endogenous (instrumented using up to 3 lags).  
LV= Laeven and Valencia (2008); DHS= De Paoli et al. (2006); LP=Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2010); DS=Detragiache and Spillimbergo (2000); RRS= Reinhart 
et al. (2003). 
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Table 5.  Output Growth and Financial Crises: Debt vs. Banking and Currency  
 
 (I) 
 
(II) 
 
(III) 
 
(IV) 
 
(V)% 
 
Debt t -4.963 (-1.89)* 
-5.435 
(-1.63)* 
-8.913 
(-1.97)** 
-8.064 
(-1.90)** 
-8.740 
(-1.93)** 
Banking t  -1.667 (-0.88) 
-9.312 
(-2.19)** 
- -3.683 
(-1.64)* 
-1.800 
(-0.93) 
Currency t -6.02 (-3.89)*** 
- -3.766 
(-3.82)*** 
-2.173 
(-1.25) 
-6.076 
(-3.51)*** 
Debt t * Banking t - 3.561 (0.63) 
- -0.220 
(-0.04) 
- 
Debt t * Currency t - - 5.921 (1.08) 
11.812 
(0.84) 
- 
Currency t * Banking t - - - -8.616 (-2.44)** 
- 
Debt t * Banking t * 
Currency 
- - - -4.193 
(-0.27) 
- 
 
     
N 4863 4863 4863 4863 4863 
Hansen test-pvalue 0.869 0.888 0.865 1.00 0.890 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) test-pvalue 
0.311 0.308 0.310 0.325 0.308 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Control variables included but not reported. 
GMM-System Estimator: Two-step using Windmeijer standard errors, Openness , population growth, openness and lagged crises as predetermined,  other control 
variables considered as endogenous (instrumented using up to 3 lags).  
% Non-contemporaneous episodes of debt, banking and currency crises.  
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Table 6.  Output Growth, Debt-GDP and Foreign Debt-GDP ratios  
 Debt-to-GDP ratio Foreign Debt-to-GDP ratio 
 (I) 
linear 
(II) 
>70% 
(III) 
>80% 
(IV) 
>90% 
(V) 
linear 
(VI) 
60% 
(VII) 
70% 
(VIII) 
80% 
Debt_GDPt -0.011 
(-1.52) 
-1.776 
(-2.62)*** 
-2.546 
(-3.14)*** 
-2.239 
(-2.79)*** 
- - - - 
Foreign Debt_GDPt - - - - -0.011 
(-1.72)* 
-1.176 
(-1.79)* 
-1.538 
(-1.67)* 
-2.418 
(-2.09)** 
 
        
Real GDP growth t-1 0.307 
(3.73)*** 
0.326 
(4.07)*** 
0.326 
(4.07)*** 
0.308 
(4.29)*** 
0.248 
(3.72)*** 
0.266 
(3.74)*** 
0.220 
(3.20)*** 
0.232 
(3.26)*** 
Real GDP growth t-2 0.057 
(1.44) 
0.045 
(1.10) 
0.053 
(1.14) 
0.055 
(1.29) 
0.036 
(0.73) 
0.028 
(0.57) 
0.047 
(0.97) 
0.039 
(0.79) 
Openness t 0.922 (2.16)** 
0.632 
(1.54) 
0.819 
(1.94)** 
0.846 
(2.32)** 
0.967 
(1.77)* 
1.104 
(2.19)** 
1.351 
(2.56)*** 
1.046 
(2.08)** 
Population growth t 0.267 (2.13)** 
0.231 
(1.86)* 
0.332 
(2.59)*** 
0.287 
(2.22)** 
0.154 
(1.28) 
0.241 
(1.65)* 
0.262 
(1.73)* 
0.228 
(1.52) 
Credit Growth t -0.018 (-1.06) 
-0.022 
(-1.01) 
-0.019 
(-0.95) 
-0.021 
(-1.19) 
-0.008 
(-0.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.28) 
-0.006 
(-0.40) 
Real GDPt-1 (log) 0.211 (1.25) 
0.093 
(0.64) 
0.169 
(1.11) 
0.175 
(1.29) 
0.081 
(0.33) 
0.132 
(0.63) 
0.226 
(1.16) 
0.098 
(0.48) 
Real Exchange 
Rate Growth t 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.57) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.70) 
 
        
N 1505 1505 1505 1505 1403 1403 1403 1403 
Hansen test-pvalue 0.676 0.648 0.663 0.706 0.649 0.537 0.754 0.683 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) test-pvalue 
0.214 0.307 0.208 0.217 0.146 0.211 0.126 0.161 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
GMM-System Estimator: Two-step using Windmeijer standard errors, Openness , lagged real exchange rate growth, lagged real credit growth and lagged credit 
growth as predetermined,  other control variables considered as endogenous (instrumented using up to 3 lags). Debt and foreign debt crises considered as 
endogenous (instrumented using up to 3 lags). 
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Annex 1 
 
Common time trends        Time FE 
  
 
ARDL- OLS           ARDL- GMM 
  
Note: dotted lines represent 95 confidence bands. 
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